英语翻译One needs to make a conscious decision as to how to bala

英语翻译
One needs to make a conscious decision as to how to balance financial system efficiency against the likelihood and severity of “accidents”.Incidence of bank failures differs across OECD countries and this observation may reflect differences in the tolerated risk level.For example,in the United States,banks do actually fail,even if the failure of large entities is rare.There have only been two years since 1934 when no banks failed in that country (that is,in 2005 and 2006).At the peak of the Savings & Loans crisis in 1988 and 1989,more than 1,000 banks failed.Since the beginning of this year,and unlike in previous years,several banks have failed.In most European countries,by contrast,policy authorities appear to have been reluctant or unwilling to close even small (insolvent) banks.
What makes it difficult to determine the tolerated risk level is the complexity of the financial system.This complexity appears to have important implications for the “accident” rate.In particular,one hypothesis in this context is that the financial system may be very efficient and stable most of the time,but that it exhibits excessive instability once thrown out of balance.Due to the non-linear feedback mechanisms in complex interconnected financial system segments,even the materialization of small risks can throw the system out of balance:Several amplifiers exist,the joint effect of which can lead to large effects from initially small triggering events.

人们需要有意识地决定如何平衡金融体系效率的可能性和严重性“意外事故” .发病率不同的银行倒闭和经合组织国家的这一看法可能会有所不同风险的容忍程度.例如,在美国,银行确实有失败,即使失败的大型实体是罕见的.有仅两年自1934年以来没有银行倒闭时,在该国（即2005年和2006年） .在高峰期的储蓄贷款危机在1988和1989年,超过1000个银行倒闭.自从今年年初,和往年不同,几家银行都失败了.在大多数欧洲国家,相比之下,政策当局似乎一直不愿意或不愿意接近甚至小（破产）的银行.
是什么使人们难以确定风险的容忍程度是复杂的金融体系.这种复杂性似乎有重要影响的“事故”率.特别是,一个假设在这方面,金融系统可能会非常有效和稳定的大部分时间,但它展示过度不稳定一旦抛出平衡.由于非线性反馈机制,在复杂的相互关联的金融体制部分,甚至物化小的风险也有可能系统失去平衡：一些放大器存在,共同作用可导致大的影响从最初的小触发事件.